When Proceduralism Denies the Right to Exist

By John-Michael Kuczynski

One of the more chilling consequences of Rawlsian proceduralism becomes visible when you follow it to its logical extreme—and that extreme has, in fact, been articulated by a prominent philosopher.

The claim? That people don’t have a right to exist.

The reasoning? Because they didn’t consent to their existence. They never signed the contract. They never agreed to the arrangement.

This idea is often presented in a highly theoretical context, usually under the banner of consent-based ethics. But once you understand what’s being said, the implication is obvious: under a fully proceduralist morality, even existence itself is ethically suspect unless it arises through a structure of prior rational agreement.

That sounds like a reductio. And it is. But it’s also, within the Rawlsian framework, perfectly consistent.

The Logic of the Veil

Rawlsian justice emerges from a thought experiment: rational agents, behind a "veil of ignorance" that hides their identities and advantages, design a fair society.

The idea is that fairness comes from procedural neutrality. No one knows where they'll land, so they'll choose rules that benefit everyone.

But what if you never had the chance to be behind the veil at all? What if you just appeared in the world, with no opportunity to consent to the structure of it?

Then, by Rawlsian lights, your presence isn’t just inconvenient—it’s illegitimate.

That’s the bridge to the claim: people have no right to exist. Not because they’ve done anything wrong, but because they didn’t get to agree to the procedure beforehand.

This is what happens when procedure becomes the sole criterion of legitimacy.

When the Premise Exposes the Rot

If Rawlsian proceduralism leads to the conclusion that existence itself is morally suspect, then something is wrong not just with the application, but with the foundation.

A moral theory that renders the human condition—being born, without consent—inherently unjustified isn’t just false. It’s anti-human.

Other moral theories may be flawed. But they rarely indict existence itself. They may impose duties, demand sacrifices, or envision impossible ideals. But they don’t suggest that your very being is a violation of principle.

Rawlsianism, taken seriously, does.

And that’s enough to disqualify it.

Final Thought

Ethical systems must be able to account for human reality. And human reality begins with unconsented existence. Any framework that sees that fact as a problem to be corrected—rather than a condition to be understood—is not a theory of justice.

It’s an operating manual for moral disintegration.